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S U  MMA RY 
This paper presents a review of the F-12’-series aircraft  control 
system design philosophy as  i t  pertains to functional reliability. The 
basic control system, i. e . ,  cables, mixer, feel system, t r im devices, 
and hydraulic systems a re  described and discussed. In addition, the 
implementation of the redundant stability augmentation system in the 
F- 12 type aircraft  i s  described. Finally, the functional reliability record 
that has been achieved is presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
The F-12 ser ies  aircraft  were designed more than a decade ago, 
yet they included concepts which have only recently become popular and 
even acceptable. One of these is the fact that, to a certain extent, 
the F-12 aircraft  a r e  control configured vehicles (CCV). They were 
designed with the objective of minimizing t r im drag to enhance the range 
capabilities. This, of course, immediately implies either very low or  
no static stability requiring the full time services of a pitch stability 
augmentation system (SAS). At high Mach numbers, the Mach effects 
reduce the directional stability. Since an engine failure o r  inlet unstart 
can produce a violent transient, i t  i s  rather obvious that the services of 
a full time yaw stability augmentation system is also important, both 
from the standpoint of pilot comfort and prevention of structural damage 
to the aircraft. These factors dictate a full time stability augmentation 
system in both the pitch and yaw axes and with a functional reliability 
comparable with that of the basic vehicle itself. This paper presents 
descriptions of the basic aircraft  control system and the redundant sta- 
bility augmentation systems that permitted us to achieve the necessary 
functional reliability . 
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MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
The configuration of the F-12 series aircraft is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The shaded areas show the hydraulically actuated aerodynamic 
control surfaces. The large inboard and outboard elevons a re  utilized 
for pitch and rol l  control. Pilot control stick motion is separated into 
pitch and rol l  commands by the elevon mixer assembly located in the a i r -  
craft’s tail cone. The outboard elevon is slaved to the inboard elevon 
through a crossover linkage system which transmits commands across the 
hot aft nacelle. The crossover linkage contains a preloaded spring cart- 
ridge to avoid structural damage should the outboard surface jam. The 
rudders a re  really all-movable vertical tails to provide the necessary 
controllability during engine failure o r  inlet unstart. 
The aircraft contains four hydraulic supply systems; two of these a re  
dedicated to the control system. The two control system hydraulic supplies 
a re  designated a s  System A and System B. The elevon surface actuators 
a re  arranged such that alternating cylinders a re  supplied by Systems A and f 
Thus, i f  either hydraulic system is lost, the remaining system will con- 
tinue to provide power fo r  the actuation of all of the surfaces. The 
verticals have a similar load sharing arrangement. 
Since the A and 33 valves porting hydraulic oil to the surface 
actuators a re  on a common shaft and in close proximity to each other, 
it is necessary to protect against intersystem leakage in the event of the 
loss of one of the hydraulic supplies. This is done by providing 
ltscavenger” jet pumps in the return area for both systems. This results 
in the return of any leakage oil back to the reservoir of the appropriate 
supply instead of loss into the failed supply. 
The roll/pitch elevon mixer is a relatively simple device containing 
the roll  and pitch feel springs and trim actuators. No complexities such 
a s  bobweights o r  q-bellows a r e  employed, and a s  a result, has proven to 
be quite reliable. The feel springs for  the verticals a r e  located in the 
stub fin and a re  incorporated into the yaw trim actuators. 
Transmission of pilot stick commands to the elevon control surfaces 
is achieved by dual cable systems to the mixer and from thence to the 
summing levers of the inboard servo elevon valves. The rudder pedal 
motion is also transmitted via a dual cable-pushrod system to the sum- 
ming levers of the vertical servos. The variations in required cable 
length due to temperature effects and flexure of the relatively long fuse- 
lage is compensated fo r  by the use of tension regulators. 
750 
Electrical power is provided by two identical generators, each driven 
by one of the engines. The generators a re  synchronized and in normal 
operation share the load. 
disconnects the failed system transferring the total load to, %e remaining 
generator. If both engines quit, causing loss of both geneqitors, a 
battery/inverter supplies power to the essential bus until iye engines a re  
restarted. 
If either generator fails, an autdFatic relay system 
' i  
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ( A F ~ S )  
The design goal of the automatic flight control system fo r  the F-12  
series aircraft was to provide optimum handling qualities in the primary 
flight regimes of the aircraft. However, another consideration was to 
provide as  simple a system as possible in order to enhance reliability. 
Since the vehicle was the first supersonic cruise vehicle, and thus would 
spend the greater portion of its flight time at  high Mach number cruise, 
the h$ndling qualities had to be optimum at these conditions. In addition, 
it was also imperative to provide good response and controllability in the 
critical areas of the flight envelcpe consisting of takeoff, landing and 
refueling. All  other flight conditions were considered transitional where 
handling qualities could be less than optimum in the interest of simplicity. 
The automatic flight control system of the F-12 series aircraft con- 
sists of the stability augmentation system (SAS), the autopilot and the Mach 
trim system. The autopilot i s  primarily to provide pilot relief modes, 
and although high reliability for this function is desirable, it is not essen- 
tial to safety of flight. Thus, the only protective measures taken in the 
implementation of the autopilot is the provision of duplex fixed authority 
limits set to prevent excessive transients for  hardover failures. The 
pilot can also disengage the autopilot by depressing a trigger switch on 
the control stick. 
\ 
, 
The Mach trim system is  also not a safety of flight parameter. Its 
function is to provide speed stability in the subsonk and low supersonic 
speed regime during manual flight. Loss of this function, however, re- 
quires increased pilot attention and workload in maintaining airspeed. 
To protect against runaway trim failures, a trim power switch is 
located directly ahead of the pilot's left knee for  easy access. This is 
necessary for two reasons; loss of pilot mobility due to the pressure suit 
and the multiplicity of circuit breakers. This switch cuts power to all  
trim systems before a runaway trim can cause the requirement of exces- 
sive forces to hold the aircraft in trim. Once the runaway condition is 
stopped, the pilot can locate and pull the proper circuit breakers and then 
reengage the trim power switch to restore power to the unfailed systems. 
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STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SAS) 
As was stated earlier,  the F-12 ser ies  aircraft  have very low pitch 
static stability and yaw directional stability a t  design flight conditions. 
This requires a greater dependence on stability augmentation during 
maneuvers and during engine-out transients. This, of co 
significant percentages of full manual authority. The co 
ities a r e  shown in  Table I. The magnitude of these authorities is such 
that pitch o r  yaw hardover failures could be catastrophic at certain flight 
conditions. 
functions a r e  essential to safety of flight, dictates they be implemented 
with a functional reliability comparable to that of the basic aircraft  or 
that of a fly-by-wire system. 
This, combined with the fact that the pitch and yaw SAS 
SAS REDUNDANCY AND LOGIC 
Because of the importance of the yaw and pitch SAS's, they a re  
implemented with triple- redundancy in  sensors, electronics and gain 
scheduling. The roll SAS is not critical, both from the standpoint of 
handling qualities and transients due to hardover failures. However, 
the roll SAS is the inner loop for all of the lateral  autopilot modes. 
Thus, to ensure the desired pilot relief and comfort, the roll SAS has a 
du a1 me ch ani z a ti o n. 
The servos for the pitch axis a r e  two dual tandem ser ies  servos, 
each dual servo driving an inboard elevon. The tandem pair a r e  coupled 
to each other by a stiff spring such that both servos will track even i f  
one i s  disengaged. If either servo were to jam, the other will still 
perform its function by distorting the spring. 
the "downstream" servo of a tandem pair were jammed, the pitch SAS 
function would only appear on the other elevon resulting in  half gain and 
coupling into roll. However, 'great care  is exercised in  providing 
a.dequate filtering of the hydraulic fluid and in  addition all main metering 
spool valves a re  designed to shear any metal chips that might get by. 
Tlitis, the probability of jamming i s  minimal. The yaw axis employs 
four ' se r ies  servos, whiffle t ree  summed in  pairs, with each pair driving 
a separate vertical. The roll  SAS uses two ser ies  servos, one for each 
inboard elevon. 
This does mean that if 
The gain scheduling is obtained f rom triple-redundant differential 
pressure sensors and altitude switches. These a r e  not part  of the Central 
Air Data  Computer, and comprise an entirely separate but simple sensing 
package. Because of the high reliance placed on the pitch SAS to provide 
static stability, an additional backup pitch damper (BUPD) i s  mechanized. 
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This consists of a separate pitch rate gyro and electronics located in  a 
controlled environment that can be switched into either the A o r  B servos. 
This system has a fixed gain and i s  to be used only below 50, 000fee t  
and at subsonic speeds. To date, there is no record of the BUPD ever 
having been used. The purpose of the BUPD was only to provide adequate 
handling qualities for refueling and landing i n  the event that the basic pitch 
SAS failed due to overheating of the normal pitch gyros. 
Simple block diagrams of the pitch, yaw and roll SAS mechanization 
a r e  shown in  Figures 2, 3 and 4. It is seen that the triplex systems 
shown for the pitch and yaw axes employ a monitor channel whose only 
function is  to provide a reference for voting. The interceptor version 
was modified i n  that all three channels of both the yaw and pitch SAS are  
active contributing one-third of the total command. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5 showing the yaw SAS. In that configuration, when the voting 
logic removes a failed channel, the gain of the remaining two channels i s  
increased by a factor of 1.5. Override provides full control gain f rom a 
single channel. On the surface, i t  would appear that the availability of 
the additional functional channel would enhance the overall reliability. 
However, the additional mechanization complexity tends to offset the re -  
liability advantage. 
The sensor and electronic circuits of the yaw and pitch SAS 
utilize triple redundancy i n  such a manner that a single failure i s  fail- 
operational with no change i n  system performance. This is achieved by 
a voting scheme which selects the "disagreeing" channel and disengages 
it as shown in  Figures 2 and 3. A second o r  third failure depending on 
failure sequence results i n  total disengagement of that axis. The use of 
tandem servos in  the pitch axis eliminates the need to double the gain in  
the rernaining operational channel in  order to maintain full system per- 
formance. However, the yaw axis electronic gain in  the remaining 
operational channel is automatically doubled to maintain performance 
because of the whiffle t ree  summing mechanization of the ser ies  servos. 
Only two channels, A and By are functional; the M channel is used 
as a reference model. After total disengagement of an axis, if either 
the A or  B channels a re  still functional, the pilot can exercise a logic 
override switch and obtain single channel performance. 
The siervos in  both the yaw and pitch channels a re  essentially quad- 
ruple, but with dual hydraulic supplies. The A hydraulic supply powers 
a right and a left servo that a r e  both being driven by the A electronics. 
The B supplflpowers the remaining two servos which a re  driven by the 
B electqonics. The\/left and right servos for each hydraulic supply are 
compared and ff they fail to track, that channel is immediately disengaged. 
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The remaining channel with its associated electronics then properly con- 
trols both the left and right surfaces with a gain equivalent to that of the 
complete system. 
The failure monitoring logic is dual redundant, i. e . ,  each compari- 
son i s  independently duplicated. Since a system failure upstream of the 
servos produces two disagreements in the voting scheme, a single dis- 
agreement does not cause a channel disengage, but turns on the M 
channel warning light. 
cause the related servo channel to disengage and turn on the associated 
warning light. 
A single indicated failure of servo logic will 
The.rol1 SAS is mechanized a s  a simple dual system with one 
channel and servo for each side. A cross-monitor is employed in the 
servo feedback loops that disengages both channels in the event of dis- 
agreement. The disengagement is indicated by a failure light between 
the two channel switches. Disengaging and reengaging both switches 
recycles the failure logic to verify the failure. 
logic override by switching off both channels and manually engaging one 
channel a t  a time to test and select the operational channel. The gain 
of this channel is automatically doubled. 
The pilot then exercises 
Certain types of servo position pickoff failures would result in limit 
cycle oscillations which would not be detected by the servo logic. There- 
fore, a separate monitor circuit is provided in each servo channel to 
detect open and short circuits in the pickoff primaries and secondaries. 
In order for  the pilot to evaluate his situation in the event of failure 
in the pitch and yaw SAS, a display of lights is presented to him on the 
Function Select Panel located on the right console as  shown in Figure 6. 
If any of the lights a r e  on, the pilot pushes the illuminated buttons to 
recycle the logic. Should this fail to reinstate the channels, the pilot 
can then assess his situation in pitch and yaw as  shown in Table 2 on 
the assumption that t light indication represents the first failure. Sub- 
sequent failures use ..same lighting sequence and as  a result, the 
particular type failure cannot necessarily be isolated. 
One of the major contributors to the maintenance of the F-12  flight 
control system reliability i s  the Mission Recording System (MRS). 
Each essential parameter of the various vehicle subsystems is monitored 
and properly signal conditioned for use in a magnetic tape recorder. 
The sampling rate for each parameter is once very three seconds. 
During the interval between samples, certain of the more signifi- 
cant parameters a re  monitored by peak-hold circuits which a re  reset 
when sampled. In the SAS each active element is  monitored. This 
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includes all sensors, gain scheduling devices, amplifiers, servos, and 
logic. 
isolation; the second is the evaluation of logic performance during sys_tem 
checkout. For the latter, the pilot exercises the SAS logic prior to each 
flight and then again as soon as the flight is terminated. This is done 
by activating the logic checkout switch shown adjacent to the function 
selector 'panel in  Figure 6. This initiates a preprogramed, built-in 
test sequence interrogating all SAS logic and AFCS disengage functions. 
Careful perusal of the resultant data tape then reveals the status of SAS 
system and the disengage logic. MRS utilization has also shown that it 
is possible to detect incipient failures. Although it is possible to achieve 
this through use of special software in  the data processing, this has not 
been done. Thus, to date, this type of examination is  performed visually 
by the data reduction technician. 
This i s  then made use of i n  two ways. The first is  obviously fault 
j 
RELIABILITY EXPERIENCE 
The Honeywell Corp. was subcontracted to provide the automatic 
flight control system and the a i r  data computer (ADC). The design 
requirements were established by Lockheed. Extremely close coordina- 
tion and teamwork between Lockheed and Honeywell was maintained in  
order to meet the design goals for the system. How well these design 
goals were attained can be illustrated by the experience with the SAS. 
Yoneywell designed and built the nation's first triple-redundant, fail- 
operational SAS f o r  the F-12 ser ies  aircraft in  the pitch and yaw axes. 
In the thousands of operational flight hours since the inception of the 
program, the pitch and yaw SAS has suffered only two functional failures. 
One was a maintenance e r r o r  where incomplete installation of the rate 
gyro packages exposed the electrical connectors to high Mach ram air 
temperatures resulting in  loss of the pitch axis. The second incident 
occurred when both the pitch A and B servos failed i n  the same flight. 
There were other instances where all three channels were simultaneously 
disengaged due to power transients during generator failures and sub- _ _  
sequent switchover to the remaining generator. However, the channel, 
disengage logic was immediately recycled and the system functioned 
normally. 
equated to a mean time between failure (MTBF) approaching 150,000 
hours vs. a predicted MTBF of 19,000 hou.rs. These numbers a re  
based on total system operating ground and flight hours in  an operational 
environment and exclude Category I and Category I1 flight testing since 
initial testing always involves some problem areas and system modifica- 
tion. 
The one hardware failure during operational usage can be 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The functional reliability of the F-12 aircraft control systems has 
met and exceeded all expectations. 
though the aircraft  and many of the control system components must 
operate i n  the mas$ adverse sustained thermal environment experienced 
by any aircraft  in’the world. It must be noted, however, that the system 
design stres sed’reliability through simplicity. 
compromise of handling qualities during what a re  considered transitional 
flight conditions. This would probably not be acceptable for commercial 
vehicles Thus, for such applications, more elaborate scheduling and 
controf laws would be required placing additional burdens on functional 
reliability. Although the F- 12 flight control system was not specifically 
designed as a fly-by-wire system, it  has demonstrated all  the attributes 
that a r e  required, and has provided a basis for the development of pilot 
acceptance of such systems. 
This has been accomplished even 
This resulted i n  minor 
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Table I - Manual Versus SAS Authority 
PERCENTAGE 
Table I1 - Failure Indications 
LIGHTS - (YAW OR PITCH) 
A AND M 
B AND M 
M 
A 
B 
FAILURE 
A ELECTRON I CS 
B ELECTRON I CS 
M ELECTRON I CS 
A SERVO 
B SERVO 
r 
DUAL 
YAW COCKPIT CONTROLS 
C F R V n  
TER BACK-UP 
PITCH & YAW 
RATE GYROS MACH TRIM & A/P 
AUTOTRIM MOTOR 
PITCH 
SERVO 
Figure 1 - AFCS Component Locations 
O’RIDE 
B-M COMPARE 
B CHANNEL 
PITCH SERVOST 
O F -  
0 
Figure 2 - Flight Controls - Pitch SAS 
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Q’RIDE 
B-M C O M P A R E  
Figure 3 - Flight Controls - Yaw SAS 
B C H A N N E L  ~- - - - - - -----. 
GYRO 
ELECT. U 
1 i RESET I 
GYRO 
A C H A N N E L  
Figure 4 - Flight Controls - Roll SAS 
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LOGIC 
7 f Y A W  SERVOS 
Yaw SAS (Interceptor) 
PRESS TO RECYCLE 
4- LIGHTS ~-+
Figure 6 - SAS A / P  Functions Selector Panel 
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